Separation of Powers and the Independent Governmental Entity After Mistretta v. United States by Buffington, Mary
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 50 | Number 1
September 1989
Separation of Powers and the Independent
Governmental Entity After Mistretta v. United
States
Mary Buffington
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Mary Buffington, Separation of Powers and the Independent Governmental Entity After Mistretta v. United States, 50 La. L. Rev. (1989)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol50/iss1/5
COMMENTS
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE
INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY AFTER
MISTRETTA v. UNITED STATES
The United States Constitution provides the framework for the
exercise of power by the federal government. Although this document
contains no express separation of powers provision, the Constitution
defines and allocates the power of the federal government between the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches.' The Framers of the Con-
stitution divided the exercise of governmental power into three branches
to prevent that power from concentrating in one body.2 Checks are
expressly provided in the Constitution creating an overlap of power
between the branches. In this way, the power of each branch is limited
by giving to a rival branch one facet of another's unique power. Using
these checks, the three branches compete among themselves to keep a
relative balance of power.3 Thus, each branch's exercise of its type of
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. The Constitution defines the power of the three main branches of the federal
government as legislative, executive, and judicial. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, "All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, "The
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." U.S.
Const. art. III, § 1, "The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish."
2. "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective,
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." The Federalist Papers, No.
47, Madison at 301 (Rossiter ed. 1961).
3. The Federalist Papers, No. 48, Madison at 301 (Rossiter ed. 1961). "But the
great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department
consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional
means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for
defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of
attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must
be connected with the constitutional rights of the place." The Federalist Papers, No. 51,
Madison at 321-22 (Rossiter ed. 1961).
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power is not absolute. 4 Under a literal interpretation of the structure
created in the Constitution, violation of the separation of powers doctrine
occurs whenever the power of one branch is exercised by another branch
without express authority in the Constitution.'
Congress' use of the independent governmental entity has modified
this formal concept of the separation of powers doctrine. An independent
entity is created by Congress to exercise governmental power beyond
the immediate control of any branch of the government. Examples of
independent entities are the independent counsel, which exercises only
prosecutorial power, and the independent agency, such as the Federal
Trade Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which
exercises the powers of all three branches, i.e., adjudicative, executive,
and rulemaking powers.
Because the Constitution does not specifically address independent
entities, analysis of the separation of powers issue becomes more com-
plicated when an independent governmental entity exercises the kind of
power designated to a particular branch. The independent entity exercises
the power of a branch but operates beyond that branch's control. Despite
the entity's detachment from the control of a branch, the Court locates
it within one of the three branches in order to test whether its exercise
of power violates the separation of powers doctrine.'
The most recent analysis used by the United States Supreme Court
to determine whether an independent entity violates the separation of
powers doctrine is found in Mistretta v. United States.7 Practical con-
siderations-such as the invalidation of administrative agencies, which
perform most of the work of the government-persuaded the Court to
develop an analytical framework that would not confront the funda-
mental separation of powers problem inherent in the structure of the
4. For example, the President can veto legislation passed by Congress. U.S. Const.
art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The Vice President is President of the Senate. U.S. Const. art. I, §
3, cl. 4. Congress can remove the President and Vice President and other executive
officers. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4. The President's power to make treaties and appoint
certain officers is subject to Senate approval. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
5. In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116, 47 S. Ct. 21, 25 (1926), the United
States Supreme Court explained that:
[f]rom this division [the Constitution's separation of powers into three branches]
on principle, the reasonable construction of the Constitution must be that the
branches should be kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly
blended, and the Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more
than it affirmatively requires. Madison, 1 Annals of Congress, 497. This rule
of construction has been confirmed by this court in Meriwether v. Garrett, 102
U.S. 472, 515, 26 L.Ed 197; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190, 26
L.Ed. 377; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205.




agency-combined powers exercised by one body. By combining two
approaches that are referred to as formal and functional, the Court has
developed an analytical framework for the separation of powers question
to accommodate the independent agency that exercises all three kinds
of powers. Moreover, the Court has extended the application of this
framework to the independent entity that exercises only one kind of
power. There are differences between the agency and the one power
entity, however, that make the application of the analytical framework
to the one power entity a dangerous precedent.
This comment discusses the development of the independent entity
and the formal and functional analyses. These two approaches to an-
alyzing separation of powers questions are then illustrated in the next
sections by discussing cases using each approach. The discussion then
turns to examining similarities between the independent agency and the
one power entity. Finally, the comment concludes that Congress and
the Court should closely follow the agency model of legislatively created
checks on agency power when creating and analyzing the one power
entity. This would minimize the unpredictability of analysis of one power
entities and give some assurance of protection from abuse of power by
using a proven system of checks. The conclusion points out problematic
aspects of the one power entity not present in the agency that make
abuse of power by the one power entity more of a risk.
Development of the Independent Governmental Entity
Congress delegates power to independent entities for two main rea-
sons: first, Congress wants to insulate a facet of a branch's power from
the control of that branch; second, Congress does not have the necessary
expertise and time to devote to specialized areas of regulation.
An independent entity that exercises more than one kind of power
is typically the agency. Congress delegates' power to oversee and monitor
8. Congress derives its authority to delegate power from U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
Congress has the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers." Prior to 1935, the Supreme Court upheld
Congressional delegation of rulemaking power to agencies provided that the legislation
giving the agency power explained Congress' policy and legislative intent. The agency
followed that criteria when formulating rules. By giving the agency an adequate or
"intelligible" standard regarding its purpose, Congress delegated rulemaking not legislative
power. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S. Ct. 348,
352 (1928). Congress made the policy decisions and the agency filled in the rules using
its expertise and experience in that specialized field.
During the Depression, Congress delegated broad power to the President by creating
independent agencies within the executive branch to attempt alleviation of the dire national
economic situation. The Court has invalidated only two such legislative delegations on
the grounds that Congress did not provide an intelligible standard for the agency's exercise
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specialized areas requiring expertise, such as securities regulation. Con-
gress allows the agency to exercise rulemaking, executive, and adjudi-
cative power. The agency promulgates complicated regulations, enforces
compliance, and adjudicates suspected violations using an informal proc-
ess dictated by the Administrative Procedure Act.9 The process is more
efficient and economical than having Congress, the President, and courts
perform the same function in the process prescribed by the Constitution.
Most independent agencies must comply with the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act,' 0 which provides day-to-day operational procedures" and the
means and scope of review of agency actions. 2
Control over these agencies is usually given by Congress to the
executive branch. Typically, that branch influences the agency's operation
through appointment of the agency officials, threat of removal for good
cause, judicial review, and control over its budget. The independent
agency is located within the executive branch because it exercises executive
power and the executive branch controls appointment and removal. 3
The agency is independent from the direct control of the executive
in order to minimize the separation of powers problem resulting from
of power. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837
(1935), and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935). Subsequent
cases have, however, approved even broader delegation of power to independent agencies.
Under subsequent delegation decisions, Congress can delegate executive, adjudicative, and
rulemaking-type power to an independent governmental entity without providing much of
a standard. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660 (1944). See generally
Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D. D.C. 1986).
9. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (West 1977).
10. Id.
11. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988) provides the procedure for agency rulemaking. Rules
promulgated by the agency have the effect of law. Schwartz, Administrative Law § 4.7
(2d ed. 1984). 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1988) involves administrative adjudication. 5 U.S.C. §
554(d) provides for separation of functions of agency officials who prosecute claims from
those officials who decide the claims. This provision is an internal attempt to minimize
the separation of powers issue with regard to the combination of functions. Congress and
the Administrative Procedure Act have exempted some adjudicatory proceedings from this
provision. Id. at §§ 6.22-6.24.
12. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988) provides for judicial review of agency actions. Review
is limited to the administrative record. Schwartz, Administrative Law § 10.2 (2d ed. 1984).
Review is also limited to the issues raised before the agency and the grounds upon which
the agency decided. Id. at §§ 10.3-10.4. Agency finding of fact is given deference, but
conclusions of law are reviewable de novo. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1988) defines agency as:
each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is
within or subject to review by another agency, but does not include-
(A) the Congress;
(B) the courts of the United States;
"This definition equates the agency with the executive branch; under it, every governmental
organ outside of the legislature and the courts is an administrative agency." (citations
omitted.) Schwartz, Administrative Law § 1.2 (2d ed. 1984).
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its simultaneous exercise of rulemaking and adjudicative power. 4 Di-
minished control by the branches reduces the degree to which the entity's
exercise of power is attributed to one of the branches. Because Congress
does not want another branch to control the agency's exercise of power,
Congress delegates power to the autonomous agency."s The agency is
within a branch, but remains detached from arbitrary control by the
head of the branch. This independence allows the agency to pursue its
policies without arbitrary political influence from the branches.
While the independent agency has been a fixture in American gov-
ernment for over 100 years, the one power independent entity has only
recently emerged. Congress creates entities, such as the independent
counsel,16 that are unlike the agency in that they exercise only one kind
of power. In this context, the Court is not concerned about a concen-
tration of several types of power in one body. This kind of entity usually
operates in a more narrow area than the independent agency, but has
broad power within that area. For example, an independent counsel can
prosecute only a small group of people-upper level executive branch
officers.' 7 Within this narrow jurisdiction, the independent counsel's
discretionary power to investigate and prosecute is virtually unlimited.
The branches have few checks on the independent entity's exercise
of power. The most potent effect the President has on agencies is
appointment of people of like mind upon vacancy of an office. He has
an impact on the course of policy to the extent he can predict how his
appointees will behave in office and whether they will be receptive to
his advice once in office. The executive must appoint with the advice
and consent of the Senate in most cases.'" In some circumstances, his
power to appoint is restricted further.' 9 The removal power of the
14. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624, 55 S. Ct. 869, 872
(1935).
15. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869 (1935)
(Congress restricted the President's power of removal over a commissioner of the Federal
Trade Commission.)
16. The independent counsel was created by the Ethics in Government Act, 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 591-599 (West Supp. 1989). The Supreme Court upheld its validity on
separation of powers grounds in Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
17. 28 U.S.C.A. § 591(b) (West Supp. 1989).
18. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
19. The Ethics Act provided that the Special Division for the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia would name the independent counsel upon
application by the Attorney General. 28 U.S.C.A. § 593 (West Supp. 1989). The com-
position of the Sentencing Commission was dictated by the Sentencing Reform Act. 28
U.S.C.A. § 991 (West Supp. 1989).
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executive branch usually is limited to good cause.2"
Congress also has restricted influence over the independent entity.
It passes the legislation creating the entity and the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, which most independent entities must follow. Nevertheless,
once the entity is established, Congress can only impeach members 21 or
alter the source legislation.
The Formal and Functional Analyses
The United States Supreme Court has applied both a formal and
functional analysis to determine whether an independent entity's exercise
of power violates the separation of powers doctrine. The two interpre-
tations have common concerns regarding the allocation of power among
the branches.
Both formal and functional approaches are concerned that a branch
not be excessively aggrandized or undermined by an independent entity's
exercise of power. Except for the most formal of interpretations, both
approaches agree that, in the context of the independent entity, there
exists a gray area in which powers of branches can be mingled beyond
the strict requirements of separation of powers. 22 The distinction between
the analyses is in the degree to which the powers can be mingled within
and beyond this gray area. Whether or not the text of the Constitution
addresses a particular structural relationship, the separation of powers
doctrine, as perceived by each approach, informs the analysis of the
relationship at issue.
Early cases involving the separation of powers doctrine established
the rule that the Constitution allocates each branch of the government
certain powers that are to be exercised exclusively by that branch. 23 A
formal analysis closely follows the text of the Constitution for instruction
regarding the acceptable amount of power overlap between the branches32
There are varying degrees of separation. On the more conservative end
20. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869 (1935) (The
Court upheld such a restriction on Presidential removal power over agency officials.)
Similar provisions apply to the independent counsel, 28 U.S.C.A. § 596(a)(1) (West Supp.
1989), and the Sentencing Commission, 18 U.S.C.A. § 991(a) (West Supp. 1989).
21. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4.
22. See Justice Scalia's dissent in Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 678
(1989); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869 (1935),
articulated a formal interpretation of separation of powers but allowed a restriction on
executive power in context of the independent agency.
23. See supra note 5.
24. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-
A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 489 (1987) describes the formal approach
as "grounded in the perceived necessity of maintaining three distinct branches of gov-
ernment (and consequently appearing to draw rather sharp boundaries)" (citation omitted).
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of the spectrum, the only acceptable overlap of power among the branches
are those checks expressly provided in the Constitution. All power des-
ignated to a branch should be exercised or controlled by that branch.
This approach uses the constitutional structure as a bright line test to
recognize when aggrandizement or encroachment of a branch occurs.
The mechanical control of an entity, such as appointment and removal
of the entity officials, is often the basis upon which the relationship is
evaluated. 25 Advocates of a formal analysis view strict adherence to the
constitutional structure as a means of preventing erosion of the ability
to check power in subsequently created entities.
According to a functional analysis, the entity is valid unless it
seriously offends the balance of powers among the branches, regardless
of whether there is a provision that on its face violates the tripartite
structure. 26 For instance, if an agency has a provision giving Congress
control over its exercise of executive power, it would be invalid under
the formal analysis based on the mingling of legislative and executive
power. On the other hand, a functional analysis would hold the structure
invalid only if the overall balance of power created by the legislative
scheme were skewed in favor of the legislative branch. A functional
interpretation looks at the practical effect of the overall structural re-
lationship created by the entity to see whether the control mechanism
actually creates an imbalance of power among the branches. In analyzing
the practical effect of the structural relationship, a functional approach
considers many factors, such as the reason Congress created it and
whether it interferes with a branch's ability to carry out its function.
A functional approach tolerates structural relationships that are not
in accord with the strict interpretation of separation of powers as long
as the created relationships have effective alternative checks. A functional
approach is based on the rationale that the structure of the Constitution
seeks to check the exercise of governmental power. As long as the
independent entities are effectively checked, the relationship created sat-
isfies that concern of the Constitution; thus, there is no need to conform
to the tripartite structure to check the entity.
According to a functional approach, the Constitution establishes
core functions of the branches. Those are the integral operations that
25. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S. Ct. 21 (1926), see infra note 28 and
accompanying text; Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103
S. Ct. 2764 (1983), see infra note 33 and accompanying text; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986), see infra note 42 and accompanying text.
26. "Functionalism is closely allied with the vision of checks and balances among
the branches of government. This vision stresses the complex interaction and tension
among the institutions of government. Such interaction presumably requires some blending
of the tasks of governance among supposedly distinct branches." (citation omitted).
Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers,
72 Cornell L. Rev. 430, 433 (1987).
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the branch must perform, the function that is uniquely characteristic of
that branch. The core function of a branch can be exercised by an
independent entity, but that exercise of power cannot impair the branch's
ability to perform its core function. 27
Cases Using a Formal Analysis
The Supreme Court used a formal interpretation of separation of
powers in Myers v. United States s to prohibit congressional participation
in Presidential removal decisions. In this case, the Court struck down
a requirement of the Tenure of Office Act of 1867 that Congress concur
in the President's removal2 9 of a postal service employee. 0 The Act
stated that the President could remove a postmaster only with the advice
and consent of the Senate.3 Congressional participation in an executive
function, such as removal of an executive officer, was an unacceptable
impediment to the President's exercise of executive power. Thus, this
interference was a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The
Constitution explicitly allows Congress to concur in appointment of
officers and to remove by impeachment. The analysis used by the Court
in this case was formal because it did not allow Congress to perform
a function not explicitly authorized by the Constitution, i.e., concurrence
in removal of appointees.
In subsequent cases in which Congress retained control over inde-
pendent entities, the Court used a formal separation of powers inter-
pretation.3 2 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,33 the
Court held that the one-house legislative veto provision in the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Act34 violated the separation of powers doc-
27. The independent counsel exercised prosecutorial power, a core function of the
executive branch. The Court determined, in Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988),
that the counsel could exercise that power providing the President's ability to perform
his core function was not impaired. Id. at 2622.
28. 272 U.S. 52, 47 S. Ct. 21 (1926).
29. The President's power of removal is incident to his power of appointment. Id.
at 119, 47 S. Ct. at 26. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, provides that the President can
appoint "all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
30. "[W]e must therefore hold that the provision of the law of 1876 by which the
unrestricted power of removal of first-class postmasters is denied to the President is in
violation of the Constitution and invalid." 272 U.S. at 176, 47 S. Ct. at 45.
31. Id. at 107, 47 S. Ct. at 22.
32. The Supreme Court recognized, in Morrison v. Olson, a distinction between the
analyses used when Congress retains control. 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2616 (1988).
33. 462 U.S. 919, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
34. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(c)(2) (West 1970).
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trine."1 Congress promulgated legislation delegating power to the Attorney
General to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United States; but,
it retained power to veto, by resolution of one house of Congress, action
taken under the delegated authority.3 6 The Attorney General decided to
allow an illegal alien, Chadha, to remain in the United States. The
House of Representatives resolved to veto the action, requiring Chadha
to be deported.
The Court respected a check in the Constitution against informal
congressional influence and action by striking down the one-house leg-
islative veto provision. The legislative veto violated the constitutionally
provided process for congressional action, which is passage by both
Houses of Congress and presentment to the President for his signature.17
As in Myers v. United States, the Chadha Court used a formal approach
to determine that, with few exceptions,"8 Congress may act only through
the legislative process.3 9 The analysis was formal because it concentrated
on the removal mechanism and the delineation of power between the
branches in the strict sense of separation of powers, rather than con-
sidering the usefulness of the veto as a check on agency power. ° Pre-
scribing a particular process for congressional action acts as a check on
the legislative branch because Congress cannot improvise informal ways
to circumvent participation by the President and both houses of Congress
in lawmaking.4 1
In Bowsher v. Synar,42 the Supreme Court employed a formal anal-
ysis to strike down the removal provision of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. 43 After reviewing budget pro-
jections submitted by the Office of Management and Budget and the
Congressional Budget Office, the Comptroller-General recommended
budget cuts to the President who was then compelled to sequester the
funds. The Court characterized the Comptroller-General's power in this
respect as executive. The removal provision violated the doctrine of
separation of powers because Congress retained the power to remove
35. 462 U.S. at 956, 103 S. Ct. at 2787.
36. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(c)(2) (West 1970); Id. at 923, 103 S. Ct. at 2770.
37. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, provides that "Every Bill which shall have passed
the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented
to the President of the United States."
38. See 462 U.S. at 955 and n.21, 103 S. Ct. at 2786 and n.21.
39. "Congress' decision to deport Chadha-no less than Congress' original choice to
delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves determi-
nations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral passage followed
by presentment to the President." Id. at 954-55, 103 S. Ct. at 2786.
40. Sargentich, supra note 26, at 470.
41. 462 U.S. at 951, 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
42. 478 U.S. 714, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
43. 31 U.S.C.A. § 703(e)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
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the Comptroller-General by joint resolution. As in Myers v. United
States, Congressional retention of the means of removal other than by
impeachment" increased congressional power beyond that granted by the
Constitution. 4  Power was improperly concentrated in the legislative
branch.
In contrast to the formal analysis of the majority opinion, Justice
Stevens' concurrence advocates a functional approach to reach the same
result. He argued that concentrating only on the removal provision
ignores other aspects of the relationship between the Comptroller and
legislative branch, which could compensate for the apparent violation
caused by the removal provision. The majority rejected the functional
approach and chose to apply a formal analysis in the context of con-
gressional control. Congress cannot delegate power to an entity that it
controls. Myers, Chadha, and Bowsher illustrate the Court's strict in-
terpretation of constitutional definition of separation of powers when
Congress retains control over an independent entity."4
Cases Using a Functional Analysis
The Court developed a functional approach to evaluate the exercise
of power by an independent agency exercising three kinds of power.
The two most recent separation of powers cases, however, concerned
the structure of independent entities that exercised only one kind of
power, unlike the typical independent agency. In cases in which Congress
did not retain power to control the independent entity, the Court has
employed a functional analysis to determine whether the entity's exercise
of power violates the separation of powers doctrine. This analysis con-
siders the entity's relationship to branches that exercise the same kind
of power. In considering this relationship, the Court retains a partially
formal perspective by trying to assimilate, or locate, the entity within
one of the three branches.
In Humphrey's Executor v. United States47 the Court held that
Congress could limit Presidential control over an independent agency
44. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6, provides that "The Senate shall have the sole
Power to try all Impeachments." U.S. Const. art. II, § 4, provides that "The President,
Vice-President and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office
on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors."
45. The Bowsher majority stated that the "direct congressional role in the removal
of officers charged with the execution of the laws beyond [impeachment] is inconsistent
with separation of powers." 478 U.S. at 723, 106 S. Ct. at 3186.
46. Strauss, supra note 24, at 515.
47. 295 U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869 (1935).
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by requiring good cause for removal of a commissioner of the Federal
Trade Commission .4 The Court distinguished between an agency official
in this case and a "purely executive" official in Myers.49 In contrast
to the strict reservation of executive power to executive control in Myers,
the Court held that independence of the Commission was more important
than the President's interest in unfettered removal power over an agency
official. An independent Commission depended on detachment from
political control and influence of the Presidency to carry out its duty.50
The analysis was functional because "the character of the office rather
than the locus of its appointment determined whether the President was
to enjoy unrestricted removal power."'" This decision qualified the sweep-
ing statement of Presidential removal power of Myers, but is also in
some respects consistent with a formal interpretation of the separation
of powers doctrine. Although Congress could restrict the President's
power to remove an agency official, Congress did not participate in the
individual removal decisions. Agency officials needed independence from
the executive branch, but the Court stated that this restriction of the
President's power was not valid when the officials exercised purely
executive functions as in the Myers case.5 2 Humphrey's Executor showed
that Congress had more discretion to modify executive power in the
context of independent agencies. 3 The Court applied a more functional
analysis in order to accommodate the agency structure.
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,5 4 the Supreme
Court upheld the ability of an independent agency to adjudicate state
law based counterclaims in administrative reparations proceedings.55 The
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, an independent agency, had
48. "[A]s to officers of the kind here under consideration, we hold that no removal
can be made during the prescribed term for which the officer is appointed, except for
one or more of the causes named in the applicable statute." Id. at 632, 55 S. Ct. at
875.
49. "The actual decision in the Myers Case finds support in the theory that such
an officer is merely one of the units in the executive department and, hence, inherently
subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of removal by the Chief Executive ....
[Tihe necessary reach of the decision goes far enough to include all purely executive
officers." Id. at 627-28, 55 S. Ct. at 873-74.
50. Id. at 624, 55 S. Ct. at 872.
51. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 4-10, at 249 (2d ed. 1988).
52. 295 U.S. at 632, 55 S. Ct. at 875. See also, Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S.
349, 78 S. Ct. 1275 (1958); Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 4-10 at 249 (2d ed.
1988).
53. See Sargentich, supra note 26, at 462. The author states that the analysis in
Humphrey's Executor was functional in nature. "Basic ambiguity in the doctrine of
Humphrey's Executor complicates this debate. While moving away from Myers' institutional
formalism, Humphrey's Executor does not abandon the theory completely." Id. at 463.
54. 478 U.S. 833, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
55. Id. at 859, 106 S. Ct. at 3261.
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authority to promulgate regulations in order to implement the Com-
modity Exchange Act . 6 The Commission also had jurisdiction to ad-
judicate counterclaims resulting from the same act or transaction as the
initial reparations claim, even though the counterclaim was not based
on the Act or Commission regulations.17 Both parties had to agree to
Commission adjudication of this counterclaim.
Schor filed a claim against his broker, Conti, grounded in Com-
mission regulations. With the approval of Schor, Conti voluntarily filed
a counterclaim in the agency proceeding based in state contract law
claiming that Schor owed him money. By deciding the state law issue,
the Commission exercised federal judicial power previously reserved only
to federal judges who had Article III assurances of life tenure and non-
reducible salary.58
The Court did not strike down the jurisdiction based on a formal
reading of the protection required by Article III for tenure and salary
of federal judges. The Court looked beyond the formal requirements
of Article III to determine whether that exercise of power by an ad-
ministrative agency violated the doctrine of separation of powers.5 9 The
Schor majority stated that Article III served to protect the role of the
independent judiciary within the three branch framework and to insure
that litigants disputed in a forum free from the influence of the legislative
and executive branches. 60 The Court examined the Commission's adju-
dicative power in relation to the judicial branch. To determine the
constitutionality of the Commission's jurisdiction, the Court looked to
the "degree of judicial control saved to the federal courts . . ., the
congressional purpose behind the jurisdictional delegation, the demon-
strated need for the delegation, and the limited nature of the delega-
tion. ''61
The majority found that the need for a forum to adjudicate claims
efficiently was an important concern prompting Congress to extend the
56. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-26 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
57. 7 U.S.C.A. § 18(b) (West Supp. 1988).
58. When agencies adjudicate, they do not meet the judicial standards of U.S. Const.
art. 111. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Com-
pensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. Const.
art. 11, § 1.
59. "[T]he constitutionality of a given congressional delegation of adjudicative func-
tions to a non-Article Ill body must be assessed by reference to the purposes underlying
the requirements of Article III. This inquiry, in turn, is guided by the principle that
'practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories
should inform application of Article III.' " 478 U.S. 833, 847-48, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3256
(1986) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 105 S.
Ct. 3325 (1985)) (citations omitted).
60. 478 U.S. at 850-51, 106 S. Ct. at 3256.
61. Id. at 857-58, 106 S. Ct. at 3260.
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jurisdiction. Adjudications in this Commission often involved counter-
claims based in contract law; denial of agency jurisdiction would compel
the parties to litigate the initial claim with the agency and the coun-
terclaim in state or federal court. Rather than encourage an efficient
resolution of the dispute, the requirement of two fora would complicate
it.62 On the other hand, litigation of both claims in state or federal
court would cause a resolution without benefit of Commission expertise.
The intent of Congress was not to withdraw the counterclaims from
adjudication by Article III courts, but to encourage efficiency by com-
bining both in an agency action. 63 The administrative adjudication of
state law issues ancillary to administrative law based claims did not
"impermissibly threaten[s] the institutional integrity of the Judicial
Branch."4
The Court refined this functional approach in the context of in-
dependent entities that exercise only one kind of power. In Morrison
v. Olson,6 the Court upheld provisions of the Ethics in Government
Act" that created the independent counsel. 67 The independent counsel
exercised the power to investigate and prosecute upper level executive
branch officials 6 for federal crimes other than class B and C misde-
meanors and infractions. 69 This power was previously exercised exclu-
sively by the executive branch. 70 The Special Division of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia7' (Special Division)
had the power to name the counsel, define his jurisdiction,7 2 and remove
him when his job was complete.73 The counsel could also be removed
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 478 U.S. at 851, 106 S.Ct. at 3258.
65. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). Seven justices joined the opinion. Justice Kennedy did
not participate in the decision and Justice Scalia dissented.
66. 28 U.S.C.A. § 591-99 (West Supp. 1989), and 28 U.S.C.A. § 49 (West Supp.
1989).
67. 108 S. Ct. at 2622.
68. 28 U.S.C.A. § 591(b) (West Supp. 1989).
69. 28 U.S.C.A. § 591(a) (West Supp. 1989).
70. Until Morrison, the responsibility to faithfully execute the laws was considered
solely that of the executive branch. U.S. Const. art. II. Myers v. United States and
Humphrey's Executor v. United States stood for the proposition that the executive branch
had power that was characterized as "purely executive" of which the executive had complete
discretion to exercise. Prosecutorial discretion was such power. See also United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974), in which the Court upheld the independence
of the special prosecutor, which was the precursor of the independent counsel. The special
prosecutor was a designated prosecutor within the Department of Justice. His independence
was established by rules issued by the Attorney General.
71. 28 U.S.C.A. § 49 (West Supp. 1989).
72. 28 U.S.C.A. § 593 (West Supp. 1989).
73. 28 U.S.C.A. § 596(b)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
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by congressional impeachment or by the Attorney General for good
cause. 74 Congress had authority to oversee the independent counsel. 75
To determine whether the independent counsel provisions violated
the separation of powers doctrine, the Court examined whether the
power of the Special Division violated Article III and whether the
independent counsel's exercise of prosecutorial power impermissibly in-
terfered with the performance of the executive's function. The Court
analyzed the degree of control that the Special Division exercised over
the counsel and the degree to which the exercise of executive power by
the counsel interfered with the executive's ability to perform its core
function. The Court defined the executive's core function as making
policy and exercising executive power. 76 The court found that the counsel
did interfere with the executive's ability to prosecute. 77 Using its reasoning
in Schor, the court concluded, however, that judicial and legislative
branch influence over the independent counsel did not impermissibly
interfere with the executive's ability to perform its core function.
The independent counsel was created to facilitate investigation and
prosecution of those officials who otherwise controlled the exercise of
prosecutorial power. Because detachment from the executive was the
main purpose for the creation of the independent counsel, 78 the Special
Division's power to name the counsel and oversee its exercise of power
was not incongruous.
The Morrison Court examined whether control over the independent
counsel was more appropriately exercised by a branch other than the
judicial through the Special Division. The Court defined the core function
of the judicial branch as the impartial adjudication of claims. The Special
Division named the counsel pursuant to the Appointments Clause of
the Constitution. 79 On the face of the Appointments Clause, interbranch
appointments, meaning one branch appointing the officers of another,
are not prohibited. 0 Discretion to define the jurisdiction of the counsel
is incident to the Special Division's power to appoint;81 however, the
74. 28 U.S.C.A. § 596(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989) provides that the Attorney General
can remove the counsel "only for good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or
any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such independent coun-
sel's duties."
75. 28 U.S.C.A. § 595(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
76. Cf. 108 S. Ct. at 2608-09. (When discussing the broad discretion of the counsel,
the Court pointed out that the authority does not include "any authority to formulate
policy for the Government or the Executive Branch, nor does it give appellant any
administrative duties outside of those necessary to operate her office," implying that those
are functions integral to the executive.)
77. Id. at 2621.
78. Id. at 2611 and 2619.
79. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See supra note 29.
80. 108 S. Ct. at 2610.
81. Id. at 2612.
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jurisdiction must be closely related to the facts set forth in the Attorney
General's application for appointment of the counsel.12
Although the Court expressed doubt as to whether removal power
was consistent with the function of federal courts, 3 it upheld the Special
Division's exercise of that power. The Court analyzed the removal power
of the Special Division from a functional perspective by examining the
quality of that power compared to the Attorney General's power of
removalA4 Because the removal power was limited to one particular
circumstance-removal of an independent counsel after his job was
essentially completed-that power exercised by an arm of the judicial
branch was not a threat to the executive branch's performance of its
core function." The Special Division's control over the counsel was not
more appropriately exercised by another branch considering the necessity
for independence and the limited amount of control it exercised.
The Court also examined the relationship between the executive
branch and the independent counsel. The Court examined the nature of
the counsel's power to conclude that the counsel did not impede the
President's ability to perform his core function. The independent counsel
is characterized as an inferior officer with limited jurisdiction and tenure.
The counsel has no "policy making or significant administrative au-
thority."8 16 The counsel's broad discretionary authority was not a vio-
lation of constitutional separation of powers because "the President's
need to control the exercise of that discretion is [not] so central to the
functioning of the Executive Branch as to require as a matter of con-
stitutional law that the counsel be terminable at will by the President. 8 17
The counsel exercised a core function of the executive but it did not
violate the separation of powers doctrine as perceived by the majority.
The Attorney General's power to remove for good cause gives the
President adequate ability to supervise the counsel's exercise of power.
Neither the counsel's exercise of limited power8 nor the Attorney Ge-
neral's restricted removal power impermissibly interfered with the Pres-
ident's ability to perform his core functions.8 9
Mistretta v. United States
In Mistretta v. United States,90 the Court upheld the United States
82. Id. at 2613 and accompanying n.17.
83. Id. at 2614.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2614-15.
86. Id. at 2619.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2622.
89. Id. at 2619.
90. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
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Sentencing Commission created by the Sentencing Reform Act. 9' John
Mistretta was sentenced according to guidelines promulgated by the
Sentencing Commission. He appealed the sentence on the grounds that
the Sentencing Reform Act violated the delegation and separation of
powers doctrine. The case was appealed directly from the district court
to the United States Supreme Court.
The Sentencing Reform Act restricts the composition of the Sen-
tencing Commission. The Commission is composed of seven voting
members and one non-voting member who promulgate and have the
continuing duty to oversee use of the sentencing guidelines. The President
appoints the commissioners with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and can remove "only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or
for other good cause shown." '92 The voting members serve a six year
term. Three of the voting members must be federal judges chosen from
a list provided by the Judicial Conference of the United States. 93 The
non-voting member is the Attorney General or his designee, whose term
does not expire. Not more than four members of the Commission may
be of the same political party.
In the Act, Congress designated that the Commission be within the
judicial branch. 94 The Commission must comply with notice and comment
procedures for promulgation of its guidelines. 95 Congress then has a 180
day period within which it can amend or eliminate a provision of the
guidelines. 96 The trial judge can deviate from the sentencing provisions
in the guidelines; 97 however, under those circumstances, he must keep
a detailed record of his sentencing decision explaining the reason for
the deviation. 9s
,The guidelines provide a method of determining the sentence for
each federal crime. The trial judge evaluates relevant factors pertaining
to the individual defendant to increase or decrease the exact length of
sentence. Parole is abolished prospectively, but a convict may shorten
his sentence by accumulating credit for good behavior during his im-
prisonment. 99
91. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3551-3586 (West Supp. 1989); 28 U.S.C.A. §§' 991-998 (West
Supp. 1989).
92. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(a) (West Supp. 1989).
93. Id.
94. Id. The Commission is "an independent'commission in the judicial branch ......
95. 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(x) (West Supp. 1989).
96. Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, Ch. II, § 235(a)(1)(B)(ii)(III), 98 Stat. 2031 (1984).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and (b) (Supp. V 1987).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (Supp. V 1987).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a) and (b) (Supp. V 1987).
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Separation of Powers Analysis of Mistretta v. United States
Affirming the district court, the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Sentencing Commission.'" According to the Court,
the Commission's exercise of power violated neither the delegation doc-
trine nor the separation of powers doctrine. The Court held that Con-
gress' explanation of policy and relevant factors for consideration by
the Commission provided an adequate guiding standard for the delegation
of power.10 The Court used a functional analysis derived from both
Morrison and Schor to test whether the Commission violated the sep-
aration of powers doctrine. 0 2 In the context of the judicial branch,
Morrison required that control over the independent counsel by that
branch not be more appropriately exercised by another branch. Schor
required that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's exercise of
state law jurisdiction not impermissibly interfere with the core function
of the judicial branch. The Mistretta majority combined these two
requirements to determine whether the power of the Commission was
more appropriately exercised by a branch other than the judicial, and
whether the judicial branch was undermined by the location of the
Commission within it. 103
Analysis of the Commission's exercise of power and its effect upon
the judicial branch determined the appropriateness of the location. ' 4
After initially locating the entity within the judicial branch according
to congressional designation, 05 the Mistretta Court applied the two step
100. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989). Justice Brennan joined in all
but footnote 11; Justice Scalia dissented.
101. Mistretta claimed that Congress delegated policy-making power to the Commission
with inadequate guidance. 109 S. Ct. at 654. The promulgation involved policy-making
by the Commission effecting the substantive rights of the defendant. Congress provided
factors that the Commission considered in determining the length of sentence. 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 994 (West Supp. 1989); 109 S. Ct. at 655-57. The majority found that these standards
were adequate for delegation purposes. Scalia agreed that the standards provided by
Congress were adequate, Id. at 677, but argued that the power exercised by the Commission
was of a non-delegable nature. The delegation doctrine did not allow delegation of policy-
making power that affected substantive rights of a defendant. Scalia found that such
power was legislative not rule-making in nature. Id. at 676.
102. Id. at 660.
103. "Congress' decision to create an independent rulemaking body to promulgate
sentencing guidelines and to locate that body within the Judicial Branch is not uncon-
stitutional unless Congress has vested in the Commission powers that are more appropriately
performed by the other Branches or that undermine the integrity of the Judiciary." Id.
at 661.
104. Id.
105. The Court used a deferential standard of review to determine whether that location
was consistent with the Constitution. The Court would invalidate a statutory provision
only for the most compelling constitutional reasons. Id. The Morrison majority likewise
employed a deferential standard for analysis of the legislation creating the independent
counsel. 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2614 (1988).
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analysis to test this determination. In the first step, the Court held that
the power of the Commission would not be more appropriately exercised
by another branch. The Court did not examine the appropriateness of
other branches exercising the same power. The task of the Court was
not to relocate the Commission to the most appropriate branch, but
only to test whether the location in the judicial branch was consistent
with the separation of powers doctrine. The Court merely tested the
validity of the legislation according to a deferential standard of review.°
The Commission's power to promulgate rules determining the length
of sentence was not inconsistent with its location in the judicial branch.
Although this power is not adjudicative in nature, its product is integrally
related to the sentencing function of the trial judge. 0 7 The Commission
was located within the judicial branch because it performed a rulemaking
function concerning issues relevant to the courts. 08 The Sentencing Com-
mission exercised the same kind of power as federal judges in the sense
that, in a similar fashion to the Commission, judges establish their own
court procedural rules.'09
To show that location of the Commission within the judicial branch
did not undermine federal courts, the Court contrasted the Commission
to Article III federal courts. The Court found that Congress did not
join legislative and judicial power within one branch because the Sen-
tencing Commission is an independent agency rather than a member of
the Article III judiciary.1 0 The Commission does not exercise adjudicative
power and, because it is an independent agency, its rulemaking power
is not vested in a court."' The Court explained that the Commission
106. 109 S. Ct. at 661.
107. Formerly, the three branches shared responsibility for determining length of sen-
tence. Prior to promulgation of the guidelines, Congress statutorily provided a range of
years as the sentence for violation of a particular crime. The trial judge considered many
factors regarding the individual defendant to determine the exact length of his sentence.
Pursuant to its authority as custodian of the convict, the executive could release a convict
prior to the end of his sentence through parole. The responsibility for determining the
sentence now rests primarily with the Sentencing Commission.
108. "[Tlhe Sentencing Commission is devoted exclusively to the development of rules
to rationalize a process that has been and will continue to be performed exclusively by
the Judicial Branch." Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 673 (1989).
109. The Supreme Court has upheld Congressional delegation of rulemaking power to
the judicial branch. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S. Ct. 1136 (1965); Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 61 S. Ct. 422 (1941); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1 (1825). According to these cases, Congress can delegate power to the judiciary
to make rules concerning the conduct of court procedure. The dissent argues that these
and other examples of judicial rule-making do not effect the substantive rights of the
defendant. Procedural rules do not effect the defendant's liberty interest in the same
manner that a rule determining length of sentence does.
110. 109 S. Ct. at 666.
111. Id. at 661.
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was characterized as an independent agency because of its structure.
The Court emphasized the control Congress exercised over the Com-
mission in contrast with its lack of control over Article III judges. On
the other hand, because the courts do not control or influence the
Commission, the Commission's exercise of power does not increase the
power of the judicial branch. The judiciary does not exercise a rule-
making function incongruous with its core function. Thus, the Court
found that the operation of the Commission within the judicial branch
does not impermissibly interfere with the judiciary's core function. Be-
cause of the nature of the guidelines and the intimate relationship to
the function of the trial judge, it was appropriate for an entity within
the judicial branch to promulgate guidelines.
Once the Court was satisfied that the location was appropriate, it
examined whether the Commission's exercise of power undermined the
judicial branch. The Commission's characterization as an independent
agency was an important factor in this analysis. The Court held that
the judicial branch was not undermined in Mistretta because the Com-
mission's exercise of power did not interfere with the judiciary per-
forming its core function of trying cases in an impartial manner. The
promulgation of guidelines is a function independent from adjudication
by federal judges.
Because of this independence from the adjudicatory function of the
courts, the restrictions on the composition of the Commission do not
undermine the judicial branch. The fact that judges serve on the Com-
mission in an administrative capacity does not undermine the impartiality
of the judicial branch in the sentencing process or trying of cases." 2
Judges are neither prohibited from extra-judicial service nor required to
serve on the Commission. Their status on the Commission does not
affect their status as judges. The fact that non-judges serve on the
Commission does not undermine the judicial branch because the function
of the Commission is not adjudicative in nature.
Control by the President does not undermine the judicial branch.
The Attorney General is an ex-officio member and the executive branch
has limited control over appointment and removal of the members. The
Commission is sufficiently independent from the executive to be protected
from political influence. Furthermore, control by the executive cannot
112. "The mere fact that the President within his appointment portfolio has positions
that may be attractive to federal judges does not, of itself, corrupt the integrity of the
Judiciary .... The Act does not, and could not under the Constitution, authorize the
President to remove, or in any way diminish the status of Article III judges, as judges.
Even if removed from the Commission, a federal judge appointed to the Commission
would continue, absent impeachment, to enjoy tenure 'during good Behavior' and a full
judicial salary." Id. at 674 (quoting U.S. Const., art. III, § 1).
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affect the status of judges on the bench-they are still protected under
Article III.
The Exercise of Power by Independent Entities
Because a functional analysis is a fact intensive examination of the
system of checks controlling an individual entity made with little regard
for the three part delineation of power provided in the Constitution,
the approach is necessarily ad hoc to a certain extent. This creates the
danger that courts will reach inconsistent and perhaps conflicting results
in determining the constitutionality of subsequently created entities. Nev-
ertheless, similarities between the agency and one power entities provide
some consistency regarding the limitations on the power of an entity
operating outside the tripartite structure. Control over the one power
entity is not vested in the branch exercising the same kind of power.
This structure is similar to the means by which an agency exercises
power. Also, these entities have similar alternative checks, such as lim-
itations analogous to those in the Administrative Procedure Act. One
power entities deviate from the agency model in some respects. It is
important to understand the reason for, and extent of, deviation in
order to see whether the Court is willing to "rubber stamp" any entity
created by Congress.
Prior to cases dealing with one power entities, agencies were con-
sidered located within the executive branch because of that branch's
limited control. The legislation creating the agency usually gives ap-
pointment and removal power to the executive branch because the ex-
ercise of control is an executive task. Also, the exercise of control
corresponded to the agency's exercise of executive power. Location of
the one power entity was justified by the Court on the basis of the
single kind of power it exercised. Mistretta teaches that location has
two separate dimensions, the kind of power exercised by the entity and
control over it. The agency located solely by means of kind of power
it exercised would be located within three branches."' The control di-
mension combines with the kind of power element to fix location within
the executive branch.
Using the Court's functional analysis, each kind of power exercised
by the agency can be tested separately in relation to the branch that
exercises that corresponding kind of power even though control lies in
another branch. The Court has long accepted an agency's exercise of
legislative or judicial power while under the control of the executive
113. Justice Scalia argued that there would be no basis to determine location of an
entity when "it is acknowledged that an 'independent agency' can be within any of the
three Branches, and not merely within the Executive." Id. at 681 (emphasis in original).
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branch. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,"4 the
majority examined the validity of the exercise of judicial power in
reference to the separation of powers doctrine. In Schor, the Commission
was located within and controlled by the executive branch. The Court
examined the exercise of judicial power by reference only to the judicial
branch and the agency's exercise of similar adjudicative power. The
Court applied a similar functional analysis to the independent entity in
Mistretta to test its exercise of power. Although the Court does not
address the issue, the independence of these two kinds of entities allows
power to be concentrated in one body without regard to the tripartite
scheme.
Some points of consistency emerge in a comparison of the limitations
on the agency" 5 to those on the one power entity. Congress was careful
not to retain power over the entity and thus violate the Chadha and
Bowsher formal requirement of congressional action. Neither the inde-
pendent counsel nor members of the Sentencing Commission are ap-
pointed or removed without restriction. The executive is given limited
power to determine the composition of the independent entities. Ap-
pointment of the most influential members of agencies can be made
only with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Special Division,
not the executive, had the power to name the independent counsel,,1 6
and the Sentencing Reform Act limited the executive's power to determine
the composition of the Commission." 7 The Sentencing Commission must
comply with notice and comment procedures to promulgate rules.
These entities' exercise of power was limited in contrasting ways.
The Sentencing Commission's exercise of discretion in determining a
range of sentence length was limited by provisions of the Sentencing
Reform Act. The Sentencing Commission had to comply with notice
and comment procedures before promulgation of rules, and was subject
to alteration by Congress within a 180 day period." ' The independent
counsel's exercise of discretion was not reviewable by a court." 9 To
compensate for the counsel's unreviewable exercise of power, the Special
Division oversaw the operation of the independent counsel. The Sen-
tencing Commission did not have an overseeing commission. Perhaps it
was a sufficient compensating check that members of the Sentencing
114. 478 U.S. 833, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
115. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for a description of checks on agency
power.
116. 28 U.S.C.A. § 593 (West Supp. 1989).
117. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(a) (West Supp. 1989).
118. Congress has the power to change a provision of the guidelines within 180 days
of its promulgation. Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, Ch. II, § 235(a)(1)(B)(ii)(III), 98 Stat.
2031 (1984).
119. 28 U.S.C.A. § 594(a) (West Supp. 1989).
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Commission' 20 had to discuss and agree upon action, as opposed to the
individual independent counsel who made decisions on her own.
In the independent entity context, accountability for exercise of
power is a problematic issue. Independence of the agency from the
branches is necessary to minimize the separation of powers implications
from the combination of powers. Accountability is associated with con-
trol. To a certain extent, the executive branch is accountable for the
agency's exercise of power. This accountability corresponds to the agen-
cy's exercise of executive power. Of course, in the context of the one
power entity, concentration of three kinds of powers in one body is
not a concern. Nevertheless, independence is necessary because the kind
of power exercised is not the power of the controlling branch. The
controlling branch cannot be held accountable for the exercise of another
branch's kind of power especially when the control is limited. The kind
of power branch is equally unaccountable when it lacks control.
Congress has devised a formula for creating a one power inde-
pendent entity that effectively neutralizes the location branch and
controlling branch's influence over the entity. According to the Mis-
tretta analysis, the degree of independence from control affects the
manner in which the entity is located. Congress is encouraged to make
entities more independent of the branches in order to meet the re-
quirements of the Mistretta test. When control over appointment and
removal is diminished to a non-influential level, the location of the
entity within the three branch scheme is determined by the kind of
power the entity exercises. For example, Congress limited executive
control over the Sentencing Commission and designated that it was
located within the judicial branch based on similarity of power. 2 1
Significant control by a branch that exercises a different kind of
power, such as the executive, could create too much interference with
the location and render it invalid.
In general, the alternative checks on the independent one power
entities should be similar to those of the agency model. Deviation
from the agency model should facilitate a compelling purpose that is
tailored to the specific reason the entity was created.
Conclusion
Approval of one power entities opens up new opportunities for
Congress to create efficient extra-branch entities that are inconsistent
120. A one power entity's exercise of power similar to that exercised by the judiciary
is probably not limited to rulemaking tasks. Congress could create a commission or a
limited forum, isolated from Article III courts, which does nothing but adjudicate a
narrow range of cases. In that case the alternative checks should be similar to those of
an agency adjudicative forum or the Bankruptcy and Claims Courts.
121. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
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with a formal separation of powers analysis. Thus far, Congress has
used the agency as a model for the one power entity to minimize
separation of powers questions. The similarity between the structure
of the agency and the one power entity perhaps persuaded the Court
to not threaten the agency by striking down the one power entity.
Application of a functional analysis that accommodates the agency
should not be extended to the one power entity. Rather than contorting
the analytical framework to protect the agency, the Court should
recognize the agency structure as an exception to the explicit tripartite
scheme that warrants application of a functional analysis. This ex-
ception could be justified by the vital role agencies play in our society
and the body of administrative law that governs the area. By applying
a functional analysis to one power entities, the Court has further
eroded its ability to evaluate the effect that an accumulation of entities
has on the governmental structure. Because the Court has applied a
functional analysis to uphold creation of one power entities, Congress
has few restrictions on its ability to create entities.
Inasmuch as the Court has resolved to apply a functional analytical
framework to the one power entity, Congress should exercise self-
restraint in the creation of these entities. The two cases involving
independent entities, Morrison and Mistretta, point out similarities
between the structure of these one power entities and independent
agencies. Congress should limit unrestrained creation of one power
entities by following the agency model. Deviations from the model
should be well justified. By using the external controls imposed upon
the agency as a model, the unpredictability of an ad hoc analysis can
be reduced.
The Court's separation of powers analysis applied to the one power
entity illuminates the way the Court may approach the exercise of
agency power in the future. Using the functional analysis developed
in recent cases, the Court can examine the exercise of power by an
agency without confronting the combination of powers issue. The
Court would analyze the exercise of one kind of power at a time in
relation to the relevant branch. In doing so, it would accept the
location stipulated legislatively without considering the effect the lo-
cation or combination of powers in one body has on the overall
balance of power.
The danger of improvised entities created at will by Congress can
be reduced by looking to the accepted agency scheme to analyze
whether the entity is adequately checked. Using the independent agency
model, however, is problematic because the agency's exercise of power
raises separation of powers issues. The agency is checked by means
other than the checks provided explicitly in the Constitution. Combined
powers and independence from branches reduce accountability while
increasing the possibility for abuse of power. The Court has developed
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an analytical framework that ignores these flaws in the structure of
the agency. The Court will not dismantle the agency system of ex-
ercising power, but will probably apply a functional analysis, similar
to the one developed in the above cases, to accommodate the agency
model.
There are dangers inherent in having entities beyond the direct
control of any branch. The branches can abuse power, but they are
politically accountable for their actions. The diminished control by
the branches increases the entity's independence and decreases the
political accountability for the entity's exercise of power. The branches
are generally not accountable for the actions of the entity because
they do not exercise control. 122 This allows "the government," using
the entity as a vehicle, to pursue political issues that intimidate Con-
gress without control by or accountability to the branches. 123 The
branch with control over appointment and removal is answerable for
the entity's exercise of power to a degree commensurate with the
amount of control and similarity of power.
Cases using a functional analysis make the delineation between
the executive and judicial branch unclear. As a result of Chadha and
Bowsher, only the executive and judicial branches can actively influ-
ence or control the independent entity. Consequently, Congress has
expanded the role of the judicial branch in working with the entities.
The function of the judicial branch has been expanded to include
performance of administrative duties it had not previously performed.
The Sentencing Commission and Special Division were located within
the judicial branch for the sole purpose of avoiding control by the
executive branch. The Special Division was created to diminish ex-
ecutive control over the independent counsel. Congress' use of com-
missions within the judicial branch expands the administrative function
of the judicial branch.
The Supreme Court is unwilling to threaten the validity of the
agency. It has tailored the analytical framework it used in the context
of the agency to the independent one power entity. The Morrison and
Mistretta decisions, supported by an overwhelming majority of the
Court, affirm the application of a functional analysis to the three power
122. In Mistretta, the Court stated that "the Commission ... is not controlled by
or accountable to members of the Judicial Branch" because it is an independent agency.
Id. at 665. Likewise the executive branch's weak control over appointment and removal
does not make it accountable for the Commission's actions.
123. Scalia suggested that Congress may find it desirable to create entities that deal
with politically unpopular issues. "How tempting to create an expert Medical Commission
... to dispose of such thorny, 'no-win' political issues as the withholding of life-support




agency. Considering the great number of agencies relied upon and the
reality that there is no limit to the number of individual entities
Congress can create, Congress is likely to exploit the one power entity.
Mary Buffington

